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Abstract 
 
The variety of country experiences with financial sector globalization has precipitated the 
emergence of a large literature discussing policies, consequences and lessons learned. China’s 
policies and performance makes an important contribution to this discussion. In contrast to many 
of its neighbours, China maintains a relatively detailed system of capital controls. During the 
Asian financial crisis that sent most countries in the region into negative rates of growth, China 
continued to expand rapidly despite having a financial system that by most objective measures 
was the worst in Asia. This apparent contradiction has led many researchers to argue that an 
explanation must lie in China’s usage of capital controls. This paper first reviews the policies 
that China has undertaken toward the globalization of its financial sector. The consequences of 
these policies are then summarised and policy implications are drawn for other countries 
embarking upon the path of financial sector globalization. It is emphasized that while China 
makes extensive use of capital controls, many have readily been circumvented resulting in 
considerable de-facto external financial liberalization. Therefore, the claim that capital controls 
are the reason behind China’s impressive growth performance should not be over-stated.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Economists have traditionally envisaged the globalisation of a country’s financial sector as being 
a growth-promoting process. For countries with a domestic savings shortfall, such a policy path 
provides access to a larger pool of capital and at a lower cost than would be possible from 
domestic sources alone. Similarly, surplus countries can lend abroad and receive a higher rate of 
return than would be possible from relying on domestic investment opportunities alone. 
Furthermore, there are also dynamic benefits as a country’s domestic financial institutions and 
markets are exposed to heightened competition and international best-practice management and 
technology. This theoretical basis provided the rationale for the trend towards financial sector 
globalisation that began in many countries during the 1970s.  
 
The observed outcome of such globalisation however has been mixed. On the one hand, cross-
country econometric evidence has generally been favourable (Levine, 2001). Nevertheless, 
examples of apparent failures can readily be cited. Since the mid-1990s at least six countries / 
country blocs have experienced a financial and economic crisis as capital has been rapidly 
withdrawn from the domestic economy and moved abroad (Salvatore, 2003). These have 
included Mexico (1994-1995), South-east Asia (1997-1999), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999) and 
Turkey and Argentina (2001-2002). It is important to recognise that crises associated with 
financial sector globalisation contain a harsh human dimension, with research showing 
significant increases in poverty associated with such occurrences (World Bank, 2000).  
 
The variety of country experiences with financial sector globalisation has precipitated the 
emergence of a large literature discussing policies, consequences and lessons learned. China’s 
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policies and performance vis-à-vis other developing and transitional economies, particularly in 
the period leading up to and during the Asian financial crisis, has occupied a prominent place in 
this discussion. Whereas its neighbours fell into negative rates of growth, China’s economy grew 
at an average annual rate of 8.4 percent during 1997-1998. This was despite the fact that China’s 
financial sector at the time was described as having “The worst banking system in Asia” (The 
Economist, 02/05/1998). The attempt to reconcile these seemingly contradictory facts has 
primarily focused on the policy mix adopted by China towards the globalisation of its financial 
sector. In contrast with other countries in the region that had earlier undertaken comprehensive 
external financial liberalisation, China maintained a relatively detailed system of capital controls. 
Yu (2000) expresses orthodoxy in contending that it was this system of capital controls that was 
responsible for China’s superior performance during the Asian financial crisis. Indeed, other 
crisis-affected economies such as Thailand (1997), Malaysia (1998) and Brazil (1999) have since 
experimented with reinstating capital controls that had earlier been removed as part of their own 
moves towards financial sector globalisation (Edison and Reinhart, 2001).  
 
The globalisation of China’s financial sector has also attracted increased attention since its WTO 
entry in 2001. This is because China’s WTO accession agreement was notable for the fact that it 
contained large concessions relating to services, in particular financial services. It also meant that 
the globalisation of China’s financial sector would now proceed according to a set timetable. For 
example, five years after accession, foreign banks in China will be afforded full national 
treatment. This reality has been met with both optimism and concern.  On the one hand, foreign 
financial institutions are enthusiastic about the prospect of gaining greater market access. On the 
other hand, there is concern, particularly amongst China’s neighbours, that the globalisation of 
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China’s financial sector will mean that less foreign capital will flow into their own economies. 
On the domestic front, the Chinese government is using its WTO commitments as a means to 
push forward its financial sector reform agenda, which has generally lagged behind the progress 
made in other sectors of the economy.  Increased competition from foreign financial institutions 
and the possibility of joint ventures and technological tie-ups could indeed promote greater 
levels of efficiency in domestic financial institutions. The chief risk associated with increased 
competition from foreign banks is the possibility of a liquidity crunch in the state banking 
system. That China’s state banks have had a negative net worth since the early 1990s is well 
known (Lardy, 1998). However, they have been able to remain liquid because the household 
sector, with few other investment alternatives, has continued to build up their holdings of savings 
deposits. If in the future these savings were channelled into foreign financial institutions, the 
precarious viability of the state banks could be exposed.     
 
The second section of this chapter chronicles the policies that China has employed toward the 
globalisation of its financial sector since the Open Door Policy began in 1979. Policies are 
grouped under three headings; the growth of foreign banks, the liberalisation of capital controls 
and exchange rate reform.  Section three discusses the consequences of polices that China has 
adopted and considers the lessons that can be garnered for other countries also undergoing 
financial sector globalisation.  Section four summarises the findings and makes concluding 
comments. 
 
2. Policies towards financial sector globalisation 
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The growth of foreign banks 2 
Foreign banks were initially confined to entering China in the form of representative offices, 
which meant they were not able to undertake activities directly related to generating a profit. 
They were also confined geographically to Beijing and the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
(ACFB 1992). During the mid-1980s regulations were introduced that allowed foreign banks in 
SEZs to begin increasing their business scope, such as enabling them to engage in profit-making 
activities including loans, deposits, guarantees and remittances (ACFB 1991). However, these 
regulations confined foreign banks to providing these services only if they were in foreign 
currency and involved foreign entities (individuals, companies, embassies, etc) (ACFB 1992). 
Thus, foreign banks continued to be entirely segmented from providing financial services, in 
both foreign and local currency, to Chinese individuals and companies. Geographical restrictions 
were gradually relaxed in the late 1980s and foreign financial institutions began to establish in 
other relatively open cities such as Tianjin, Nanjing and Fuzhou. In 1994, the first national 
regulations since 1982 were released that formed the legal basis by which the People’s Bank of 
China could examine, approve and control foreign financial institutions (ACFB 1995). This 
document retained restrictions over the operations of foreign banks and detailed what many 
foreign institutions have considered onerous requirements for setting up in China, particularly in 
light of their limited business scope. For example, before a foreign bank could apply to establish 
a branch in China it must have maintained a representative office for at least two years. In 
addition, the total assets of the applicant had to be greater than USD20 billion. The year 1996 
marked the first time that foreign banks were permitted to provide any sort of local currency 
RMB business (ACFB 1997). In a pilot project selected foreign banks located in the Pudong 
                                                 
2 The discussion in this chapter is restricted to foreign banks. Other foreign financial institutions such as finance and 
insurance companies are left to be discussed in future work.  
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district of Shanghai were allowed to accept RMB deposits from foreign individuals (who had 
lived in China longer than one year), foreign enterprises (including those from Hong Kong SAR 
and Macao SAR), or re-deposits of their RMB loans to non-foreign funded enterprises. Similarly, 
they were allowed to offer RMB loans and provide guarantee services to foreign enterprises or 
non-foreign funded enterprises that had received their foreign currency loans or guarantees 
(Bonin and Huang, 2002). This scheme gradually expanded and at the time of WTO entry in 
2001 there were 31 foreign banks approved to offer such services, of which 23 were located in 
Shanghai and 8 in Shenzhen. The total RMB assets of these banks had reached RMB45 billion 
(ACFB 2002). The asset share of foreign banks however remained meagre as they accounted for 
less than two percent of the total assets of China’s banking system. Their share of the RMB 
market was even smaller. For example, at year-end 2001 foreign banks held only 0.34 percent of 
the RMB loans market (ACFB 2002). 
 
WTO accession committed China to greatly expanding the business scope of foreign banks. 
Table 1 is based on Bonin and Huang (2002) and summarises China’s WTO commitments in the 
banking industry.  
Insert Table 1 here 
Upon accession, China cancelled geographical and client limitations to approved foreign banks 
in handling foreign exchange business. This meant that these banks could provide foreign 
currency services to Chinese enterprises, whereas previously they had been restricted to 
servicing only foreign individuals and enterprises. Accession also meant that in the first wave of 
financially open cities (see Table 1) approved foreign banks were able to provide RMB services 
to foreign companies and individuals. Previously such activities had been undertaken only on a 
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pilot basis in Shanghai and Shenzhen. As of end-October 2003, 84 of the 191 foreign banks in 
China held an RMB license (People’s Daily, 11/12/2003). One of the most significant events 
since WTO entry occurred in late 2003 when foreign banks that held an RMB license were also 
permitted to apply to handle RMB business with Chinese enterprises in the 13 cities that had 
been declared financially opened by this time (People’s Daily, 01/12/2003). This marked the first 
time foreign banks had been permitted to provide RMB services to Chinese enterprises. In 
January 2004, four foreign banks were given approval to begin such business (People’s Daily, 
12/02/2004).   
 
Yet, despite such instances of banking sector globalisation, the asset share of foreign banks in 
China has failed to increase measurably in the immediate years following WTO entry. At end-
October, 2003 the total assets of foreign banks in China were USD46.6 billion, which only 
accounted for 1.4 percent of the total banking assets in China (Liu, 2003). Several factors have 
been put forward to explain why foreign banks have yet to become significant players in China’s 
domestic financial sector. First, during the five-year phase in period many foreign bank activities 
remain subject to restrictions, as does their geographical location. Through 2004, foreign banks 
still cannot provide RMB services to either foreign or domestic entities in most cities in China. 
This means they remain segmented from the 1.3 billion people, RMB1200 billion local-currency 
savings market (The Banker, 03/11/2003). Second, the approval process for foreign banks to 
expand their operations is extremely slow. For example, foreign banks have to wait 12 months 
after a branch license has been issued before they can apply to open another branch. This has 
meant that even the largest foreign bank in China, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC), has a network consisting of only nine branches. This is in contrast to the 
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Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the largest domestic bank in China, which has 8800 
branches (The Banker, 03/11/2003). Third, to apply to undertake RMB business a foreign bank 
branch must have made profits in two consecutive years of the three prior to its application.  
 
The gradually deepening globalisation of China’s banking sector has also prompted China’s 
regulatory authorities to conform to international norms regarding the prudential control of 
financial institutions. In 2003 the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) announced 
that new regulations on capital adequacy standards for commercial banks would be introduced 
based on the original 1988 version of the Basel Accord, an international convention on financial 
institution risk management (China Daily, 15/08/2003)3. As part of this process, in January 2004 
two state banks, the Bank of China and China Construction Bank, received a fresh capital 
injection of USD45 billion as part of a pilot program to bring their capital adequacy ratio above 
the eight percent required by the Basel Accord and prepare them for public listing in the near 
future (People’s Daily, 10/02/2004). From 2004, China’s state-owned commercial banks and 
joint shareholding commercial banks will also adopt the internationally accepted five-category 
loan classification system that grades loans as being either Pass, Special-mention, Substandard, 
Doubtful and Loss (People’s Daily, 06/09/2003).  
 
An increasing number of foreign banks have also been given permission to buy stakes in Chinese 
banks. HSBC became the first foreign commercial bank after WTO entry to take an equity share 
in a domestic lender when it purchased an eight percent stake in the Bank of Shanghai in late 
2001 (People’s Daily, 07/01/2002). In addition, China’s asset management companies and banks 
                                                 
3 China’s regulatory authorities have also stated that they will not be seeking to implement the new version of the 
Basel Accord due to implemented in G-10 countries in 2006.  
 9
have been forming joint ventures with foreign financial institutions in an effort to sell off the 
large volumes of non-performing assets sitting on their balance sheets (People’s Daily, 
03/12/2002; People’s Daily, 09/07/2003). China’s domestic banks have also been active in 
undertaking offshore expansion. At year-end 2001, domestic Chinese banks had established 452 
banking institutions overseas that held total assets of USD151 billion.  The bulk of this 
expansion was in the Hong Kong and Macao Special Autonomous Regions, which accounted for 
374 of such institutions and assets of USD117 billion (ACFB 2002).   
 
Liberalisation of capital controls 
China’s Open Door Policy signalled a new willingness on the part of the government to use 
foreign capital to fund domestic investment. During the 1980s the majority of this capital came 
in the form of foreign loans, and official donors such as foreign governments and international 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank featured 
prominently. These loan inflows averaged around one percent of GDP, with a peak of 1.68 
percent in 1990. Foreign direct investment (FDI) was significant and increasing during the 1980s 
but never exceeded one percent of GDP (Laurenceson and Chai, 2003). National stock markets 
were not established until 1991 and hence there was no foreign portfolio investment to speak of.   
 
While FDI trailed foreign loan inflows during the 1980s, polices that liberalized FDI in the early 
1990s contributed to FDI inflows averaging around 4 percent of GDP during the 1990s, with a 
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peak in 1994 of 6.22 percent4. In 2002, China absorbed more FDI than any other country in the 
world, including the U.S (People’s Daily, 02/01/2003). Policy liberalisation included -   
a. decision-making power with respect to the screening and approval of FDI gradually 
moved away from the central government towards local and provincial-level governments 
(ACFERT 1985; ACFERT 1997/8).   
b. ownership restrictions were relaxed away from joint-venture requirements and an 
increasing proportion of FDI came in the form of wholly owned foreign enterprises. During the 
period 1979-1983, wholly owned foreign enterprises accounted for only three percent of FDI 
inflows. By 1997 this share had grown to 36 percent (ACFERT 1997/1998) 
c. managerial autonomy increased over time relating to factors such as input, output, 
pricing and financial decisions (Chai, 1998).  
d. incentives were provided such as offering concessions on customs duties, industrial 
and commercial taxes, income taxes and taxes on profit remittances (ACFERT 1985). They also 
included reduced fees for land use, labour services and other public utilities (Chai, 1998). While 
these incentives were initially confined to FDIs located in SEZs, over time they become more 
widely available, particularly to those cities and provinces located in the coastal regions (Lardy, 
1995).  
e. sectoral controls were relaxed and China began to open up its services sector including 
banking, retailing and telecommunications, as well as major infrastructural activities (Chai, 
1998).  
 
                                                 
4 It should be noted however that a significant proportion of this FDI could in fact be capital of Chinese origin 
seeking to take advantage of concessions extended to FDI. Lardy (1995) reports that the World Bank in 1992 
guessed that round-trip capital might comprise as much as 25 percent of gross investment inflows into China.  
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Aside from FDI, the formation of national stock markets in 1991 made it possible for foreigners 
to undertake portfolio investment in China. Nevertheless, foreigners were only permitted to 
purchase equity in Chinese companies listed on the B-share market. The A-share market, which 
contained a greater number of listed companies, was reserved solely for Chinese individuals and 
companies. Controls over other types of capital flows, such as foreign loans and Chinese 
investment abroad, remained largely in place (see Yu, 2000 and IMF, 2003).  
 
The presence of capital controls however does not necessarily imply that they have been 
effective in restricting capital flows. There is growing empirical evidence to suggest that China’s 
capital controls have become increasingly porous over time. For example, despite the 
requirement that foreign loans be approved and registered, during the 1990s many of China’s 
non-bank financial institutions borrowed heavily from abroad and even the SAFE acknowledged 
that regulations were regularly being flouted (ACFERT 1992/3). The bankruptcy in 1998 of 
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company (GITIC), then one of China’s largest 
non-bank financial institutions, is instructive. GITICs experience mirrored the situation of many 
financial institutions throughout Asia where a combination of moral hazard and lax prudential 
frameworks led to a rapid expansion in borrowing to fund largely speculative investments. 
GITIC, for example, became the largest property developer in southern China (The Economist, 
16/01/1999). At the time of its bankruptcy GITIC had USD1.2 billion in registered foreign 
currency borrowings (Time International, 01/02/1999). GITICs total foreign borrowing however 
far exceeded this official amount. By the end of liquidation proceedings it was revealed that 
GITIC had debts amounting to USD3 billion, of which 80 percent came from over 130 foreign 
banks (Xinhua News Agency, 28/02/2003).  Similarly, capital controls designed to prevent 
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Chinese capital from moving abroad have met with only limited success as several studies have 
documented large and increasing volumes of capital flight exiting China (Gunter, 1996; Wu and 
Tang, 2000). Chai (1994) and Lardy (1995) were amongst the first to note that for much of the 
reform period China has in fact been a net capital exporter. McKibbon and Tang (2000) quote 
World Bank data and assert that in 1995 China was already the eighth largest capital supplier in 
the world and the largest one among developing countries.  
 
Exchange rate reform 
At the start of the Open Door Policy the RMB was not convertible and highly overvalued being 
set at around RMB1.5 / USD (Chai, 1998). In 1981 a shadow exchange rate, known as the 
Internal Settlement Rate, was introduced alongside the official rate and was calculated from the 
average cost of earning a dollar through exports and was set at RMB2.8 / USD. This represented 
an effective devaluation of the RMB by 50 percent for trading enterprises. Further devaluation 
then took place on several fronts. Firstly, the official exchange rate was devalued on numerous 
occasions. In 1985 the official exchange rate was aligned with the Internal Settlement Rate at the 
time, RMB3.71 / USD.  Secondly, the official exchange rate experienced downward pressure 
through the introduction of swap markets for foreign exchange, where companies, and later, 
individuals, could sell surplus foreign currency at rates that were determined by demand and 
supply forces.  It has been estimated that by 1992 the share of foreign exchange traded at the 
market rate was 80 percent. In 1994 the official exchange rate was abolished and unified with the 
swap market exchange rate. Chou and Shih (1998) show that while the RMB was considerably 
overvalued in the early stages of the reform period, it had largely come to reflect its equilibrium 
value by the 1990s. Since the mid-1990s China’s exchange rate system has been a managed 
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float, whereby market forces nominally determine the exchange rate in the interbank foreign 
exchange market. It is however a dirty float in the sense that daily movements of the RMB/USD 
exchange rate are limited to 0.3 percent on either side of a basic rate announced by the central 
bank. The daily movement of the RMB versus the Hong Kong dollar and Japanese yen is limited 
to one percent (IMF, 2003).  
 
In 1996, the RMB became convertible for current account transactions. This watershed was 
reached earlier than expected with officials and commentators in 1993 discussing a ten-year time 
frame. Tsang (1997) at the time made the point that unless current account convertibility was tied 
to liberalisation of the trade control system (such as a reduction in tariffs, quotas, licenses, etc) it 
would be of little practical relevance. Subsequent years have revealed that China has made 
enormous progress in this respect, even prior to joining the WTO. Lardy (2002) for example 
states:  
“By the eve of its entry into the World Trade Organization the average statutory import 
duty rate was only 15 percent, two-thirds less than the peak level of the 1980s. More important, 
by the second half of the 1990s actual import duties were only a small fraction of the average 
statutory rate. Similarly, by the eve of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, the 
state had reduced the number of imports restricted by quotas and licenses by 80 per cent 
compared with the early 1990s. Only 4 percent of all tariff lines remained encumbered by import 
quotas and licenses”.  
 
In 1997, following on from the earlier than expected achievement of current account 
convertibility, China’s leaders announced the goal of achieving capital account convertibility by 
 14
year 2000 (Groombridge, 2001). The events of the Asian financial crisis however saw this goal 
being dropped from the immediate policy agenda. Nonetheless, Hu (2001) argues that the 
achievement of current account convertibility and WTO accession amounts to significant de-
facto capital account convertibility. For example, one of the most popular methods for Chinese 
companies to illegally move capital abroad has been through the misinvoicing of trade (the over-
invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports). The achievement of currency convertibility 
for current account transactions, and WTO-mandated trade and investment liberalisation more 
generally, has only served to make this process easier. The most significant official move 
towards full convertibility since WTO entry has been the introduction of the Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme. This gives approved foreign institutional investors limited 
access to the A-share market. A QFII can apply for a foreign exchange quota to be used for 
securities investment ranging from USD50million to USD800 million. As of October 2003, nine 
QFII licenses had been issued and in aggregate these foreign institutional investors received an 
investment quota of USD975 million to buy A shares, bonds and mutual funds (China Daily, 
25/10/2003).  
 
3. Consequences of China’s policy approach and lessons 
 
Given that China is still in the midst of the globalisation of its financial sector, the consequences 
of some policy choices, particularly those implemented after WTO entry, remain unclear. It is 
still too early to discuss the consequences that removing restrictions on foreign banks will have 
on the efficiency and stability of the domestic financial sector5. What follows therefore is a broad 
                                                 
5 Bonin and Huang (2002) attempt to shed light on this topic by considering the experience of the transitional 
economies of eastern and central Europe and what this will likely mean for China. 
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sketch of some of the major identifiable consequences of China’s policies to date, and where 
possible lessons for other countries also undertaking the transition to a globalised financial sector 
are drawn.  
 
a. The combination of capital controls and the lack of full RMB convertibility has contributed to 
a rapid increase in domestic financial depth and reduced China’s reliance on foreign capital.  
 
China’s financial depth (measured as broad money minus currency in circulation divided by 
nominal GDP) increased from 19 percent in 1978 to 134 percent in 2000 (Laurenceson and Chai, 
2003). This meant that during the reform period China has been able to match investment rates 
ranging between 30-40 percent of GDP with domestic savings rates of the same magnitude. In 
2001 the average external debt stock relative to gross national income ratio amongst developing 
countries was 118.5 percent. In China the comparative figure was just 15 percent (World Bank, 
2003). This assertion does however need to be qualified as other, possibly more important 
factors, have also been responsible for increases in financial depth such as the maintenance of 
positive real interest rates and increasing financial institution density (Laurenceson and Chai, 
1998). Furthermore, as noted above, controls over Chinese capital moving abroad appear to have 
become less effective over time.  
 
It is not possible to come to definitive conclusions regarding the value of policies that have 
reduced China’s reliance on foreign capital. On one hand, public policies that have promoted 
high domestic savings rates have been identified as contributing to the rapid rates of capital 
accumulation and economic growth that has been observed throughout the Asian region during 
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the post-war period (World Bank, 1993). Furthermore, it may be argued that such policies have 
helped China avoid a “foreign debt trap” of the type experienced by other developing countries 
(McKinnon and Pill, 1996). Yet, according to economic theory, there is no particular benefit 
intrinsically linked to funding investment through domestic savings. Indeed, if domestic savers 
can achieve higher rates of return from investing abroad, or domestic investors can attain funds 
at a cheaper rate abroad, then such policies could well be welfare reducing.  
 
Another consequence of the increase in financial depth has been that the Chinese government has 
earned considerable seigniorage revenue (Kime, 1998). This is important in the context of a 
transitional economy, which tends to lose it traditional tax base in the move to a market economy 
(McKinnon, 1991) and China is no exception (Wong, et al., 1995). The collection of seigniorage 
revenue further reduced China’s need to borrow from abroad.  
 
b. The removal of controls on FDI, while maintaining relatively tight controls on foreign 
borrowing and portfolio investment, has contributed to the stability of foreign capital inflows 
into China.    
 
FDI involves a long-term commitment to the host country through a physical presence. FDI also 
carries the added benefit that it usually includes the export of technology (broadly defined) 
whereas foreign loans and portfolio investment are solely financial in nature. The development 
benefit to China from FDI has been well established (Kueh, 1992). This stability of foreign 
capital inflows was never more evident than during the Asian financial crisis (Table 2). The 
affected economies experienced plummeting exchange rates and large net outflows of highly 
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liquid capital such as short-term debt and portfolio investment. China also experienced net 
outflows of these types of capital but was far less exposed. While acknowledging the role played 
by capital controls in providing a stable supply of foreign capital inflows, it is equally important 
to restate that controls over Chinese capital moving abroad were of limited effectiveness. Thus, 
the general role of capital controls in shielding China from the instability of the Asian financial 
crisis should not be overstated.  
Insert Table 2 here 
China’s policy of discriminating in favour of FDI could well offer lessons for other countries. 
The stability of capital inflows is important, particularly if it is accepted that highly liquid capital 
flows are vulnerable to market failure such as herding behaviour and contagion effects. It is also 
the poor who are disproportionately affected by rapid capital outflows and exchange rate 
depreciation if a large proportion of basic necessities are imported.  
 
Retaining controls over foreign loans and portfolio investment is a specific example of China’s 
overall approach to financial sector globalisation of gradualism. There is a long history of debate 
in the literature of financial sector globalisation regarding the relative merits of gradualism 
versus a “big bang” approach (Tsang, 1997). China’s experience lends credence to the benefits of 
a gradual approach. It is hard to conceive that China could possibly have grown even faster had it 
pursued a more “big bang” approach. Also, if the relative “big bang” approach to financial sector 
reform taken by transitional economies in Eastern Europe during the 1990s serves as any sort of 
counterfactual to China’s experience, then China’s subsequent superior economic performance is 
instructive. IMF (1999) shows that over the period 1991-98, inflation in China averaged 9.5 
percent annually, compared with 130 percent in the transitional economies of central and eastern 
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Europe. The average growth rate of real GDP over the same period was 10.8 percent in China 
compared with –2.0 percent in the other transitional economies. Gorton and Winton (1998) 
further note that financial sector reform in most transitional economies has gone hand in hand 
with increased instability and virtually all have experienced some form of banking crisis. 
Scholtens (2000) adds that the financial sector in most transitional economies remains shallow. 
China has so far avoided a financial crisis and the World Bank (1996) reports that although most 
transitional economies had a similar level of financial depth during the late 1980s, by the mid-
1990s China’s level of financial depth was more than double that of the transitional economies in 
central and eastern Europe. The benefits of gradualism are theoretically grounded in the notion 
of second-best. That is, while complete liberalisation may be optimal in a world of complete and 
perfect markets and institutions, the absence of one or more of these conditions provides a 
rational for government intervention. Controls over highly liquid capital flows are a prime 
example. Due to the fact that these types of capital flows are vulnerable to market failure, their 
productive usage is contingent upon the existence of a highly competent prudential framework. 
In the absence of such a prudential framework, capital controls could constitute an optimal 
policy in a second-best sense6.  
 
This is not to suggest that specific policies such as those that favour FDI or the gradualist 
approach in general come without cost. For example, controls over foreign loans and portfolio 
investment have likely come at the cost of reduced access to investment capital for China’s 
emerging private sector. Despite high overall rates of domestic savings and investment, the 
private sector has often had difficulty in accessing external financing because the state banking 
                                                 
6 Laurenceson and Chai (2003) discuss several prerequisite conditions that are needed before China can undertake 
full-scale external financial liberalisation.  
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system has channelled the bulk of household savings towards state-owned enterprises (Gregory 
and Tenev, 2001). It is also worth noting that other countries may not achieve the same degree of 
success China has had simply by copying its policies. Due to its enormous market potential, 
China has been able to attract large volumes of foreign capital in spite of the existence of 
controls over foreign loans and portfolio investment. Other countries may suffer a greater 
opportunity cost in terms of foregone investment if similar policies were implemented.    
 
c. Policies that have liberalized coastal cities before the inland regions have contributed to the 
bulk of foreign capital being directed towards the coastal region.  
 
Globalisation in itself would naturally lead to China’s coastal regions receiving a 
disproportionate share of foreign capital due to their strategic location for trade and investment. 
Policies that have first liberalized coastal cities have exaggerated this effect. This has important 
implications because an empirical link between globalisation (of trade and finance) and growing 
regional income inequality in China has been found by several recent studies (Jones, et al., 2003; 
Zhang and Zhang, 2003). This is not to say that globalisation has contributed to absolute income 
declines in the central and western regions but rather that it has contributed to coastal cities 
growing relatively fast. Thus, opening up the coastal regions first has further worsened regional 
income inequalities. The lesson for other large countries in this respect is self-evident. In the 
interests of promoting sustainable growth, governments need to better manage the distributional 
consequences of globalisation, not exaggerate them. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
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China’s policy approach to financial sector globalisation has differed from both its neighbours in 
Asia and other transitional economies in Europe. Whereas China’s neighbours underwent 
comprehensive financial sector globalisation during the 1980s and 1990s, China continues to 
retain many capital controls. While other transition economies adopted a “big bang” approach to 
financial sector globalisation, China has adopted a more gradual approach. It is this different 
approach, and China’s exceptional relative growth performance, that has prompted the attention 
of researchers. The changes brought by WTO entry have further heightened interest in the topic 
of China’s financial sector globalisation.  
 
This chapter first discussed the types of policies China has used with respect to the globalisation 
of its financial sector. Prior to WTO entry in 2001, controls over foreign banks and international 
capital flows were largely maintained. The most prominent exception was FDI inflows. The 
achievement of RMB convertibility for current account transactions in 1996 was a watershed and 
additionally had the unintended effect of weakening the effectiveness of controls designed to 
stop Chinese capital moving abroad. Since WTO entry, foreign banks have been able to 
gradually expand their business scope into the RMB deposits and loans market and foreign 
investors have gained some access to China’s A-share market. There has also been increased 
institutional cooperation with foreign financial institutions taking equity stakes in Chinese banks 
and helping them sell off non-performing assets. Furthermore, China’s prudential authorities 
have based their latest regulatory framework on the international norm of the Basel Accord. 
Financial sector globalisation in China has also had a distinct geographical element, with 
liberalisation first being undertaken in coastal cities before later spreading to the central and 
western regions.   
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China’s policies with respect to global financial integration have had several consequences. 
These have included reducing the reliance on foreign capital, skewing foreign capital inflows 
toward the form of FDI and directing the bulk of foreign capital inflows to the coastal regions. 
This experience offers a number of lessons for other countries. China’s rapid growth and relative 
stability compared with other developing and transitional economies suggests that maintaining 
some capital controls can form part of an optimal policy framework in a second-best sense. 
Capital controls that have led to the bulk of foreign capital inflows being in the form of FDI have 
been particularly effective in contributing to stability. On the other hand, China’s experience 
with capital flight and instances of capital control avoidance more generally, highlights that 
capital controls alone cannot segment a domestic financial system from international capital 
flows. Capital controls simply add to the transaction costs associated with such flows. Thus, 
citing the existence of capital controls as the primary reason China performed relatively well 
during the Asian financial crisis is dubious. Other large countries would also do well to note that 
policies that phase in liberalisation on a geographical basis could worsen the potential of the 
globalisation process to contribute to regional income inequalities. In conclusion, China’s 
experience to date has already provided researchers with a rich case study of the process of 
financial sector globalisation and its interplay with policy choices. As the impact of WTO 
accession becomes clearer in the future, the lessons China offers for other countries undertaking 
financial sector globalisation will only grow.  
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Table 1. Timetable of China’s WTO banking sector commitments 
 WTO entry plus (years) 
  0 1  2 3 4 5 
Relaxation of 
geographical 
restrictions  
Shanghai 
Shenzhen 
Tianjin 
Dalian 
Guangzhou 
Qingdao 
Nanjing 
Wuhan 
Jinan 
Fuzhou 
Chengdu 
Chongqing 
Kunming 
Zhuhai 
Beijing 
Xiamen 
Shantou 
Ningbo 
Shenyang 
Xian 
No 
geographical 
restrictions 
Relaxation  
of client 
coverage 
restrictions 
On 
accession 
no 
limitation 
on foreign 
currency 
business 
Local currency business to Chinese enterprises only No client 
restrictions 
Relaxation of 
company 
licensing 
restrictions 
Total assets more than USD10 billion to establish subsidiary or joint 
venture. 
Total assets more than USD20 billion to establish a branch 
Further licensing requirements to engage in local currency business are 3 
years business operations in China, being profit making for 2 consecutive 
years prior to the application. 
No 
establishment 
restrictions 
Activities 
allowed 
without 
exception 
Auto financing by non-bank financial institutions 
Provision and transfer of financial information / software 
Advisory, intermediary services including credit reference and analysis, investment 
mergers and acquisitions and portfolio research. 
Source: Bonin and Huang (2002). 
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Table 2. Exchange rates1 and capital flows2 during the Asian financial crisis 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 
China 
 
Exchange rate  
Net flows on short-term debt 
Net Foreign direct investment 
8.3
0.4
5.3
8.3
0.7
5.1
 
 
8.3 
-1.5 
4.7 
 
 
8.3 
-0.2 
3.9 
Thailand 
 
Exchange rate 
Net flows on short-term debt 
Net Foreign direct investment 
25.3
2.0
1.3
31.4
-7.2
2.8
 
 
41.6 
-7.3 
6.5 
 
 
37.8 
-5.3 
5.2 
Malaysia 
 
Exchange rate 
Net flows on short-term debt 
Net Foreign direct investment 
2.5
6.6
5.3
2.8
4.1
5.4
 
 
3.9 
-9.5 
3.2 
 
 
3.8 
-3.3 
5.3 
Indonesia 
 
Exchange rate 
Net flows on short-term debt 
Net Foreign direct investment 
2342.3
2.8
2.8
2909.4
0.3
2.2
 
 
10013.6 
-10.8 
-0.4 
 
 
7855.2 
-1.2 
-2.1 
Korea 
 
Exchange rate 
Net flows on short-term debt 
Net Foreign direct investment 
804.5
3.9
0.5
951.3
-2.7
0.6
 
 
1401.4 
-0.5 
1.7 
 
 
1188.8 
1.6 
2.3 
Notes: 
1. Units of domestic currency / USD. Figures listed are period averages. The source is IMF (2004). 
2. Capital flow figures are expressed as a percentage of gross national income. Short-term debt is defined as debt 
that has a maturity of one year or less. The source is World Bank (2003). 
 
